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1.  Introduction
T
he effects of climate change will be 
spread out over what might be called 
the distant future—up to centuries and even 
millennia from now. The logic of compound 
interest forces us to say that what one might 
conceptualize as monumental events do not 
much matter when they occur in the distant 
future. Perhaps even more disconcerting, 
when exponential discounting is extended 
over very long time periods, there is a 
notoriously hypersensitive dependence of 
cost–benefit analysis (CBA) on the choice of 
a discount rate. Seemingly insignificant dif-
ferences in discount rates can make an enor-
mous difference in the present discounted 
value of distant-future payoffs. In a very-
long-run situation like climate change, it may 
not be too much of an exaggeration to say 
that almost any answer to a CBA question 
can be defended by one particular choice or 
another of a discount rate.
A major unresolved difficulty with dis-
counting climate change investments con-
cerns the appropriate adjustments for risk. 
Climate change is characterized by deep 
structural uncertainties and the possible exis-
tence of really bad states that we would like 
to insure against. It seems plausible that this 
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insurance effect might be important in some 
climate-change investments and it needs 
somehow to be incorporated into project-
specific discounting. The paper attempts to 
get at this aspect via a parameter quantifying 
the degree to which an investment hedges 
against the bad tail of catastrophic damages 
by insuring positive expected payoffs even in 
worst-case scenarios.
Suppose, for the purpose of this paper, that a 
descriptive or positive approach to discounting 
climate change is adopted, which provision-
ally accepts previous historical values of the 
marginal product of capital in the real world 
as a proper guidance for future discount rates. 
(This assumption has been vigorously chal-
lenged in some parts of the literature,
1 but that 
is the subject of another paper.) The question 
then becomes: which real-world interest rate 
to use? Here two prototype real-world inter-
est rates stand out. One is the economywide 
average return on all investments. The other 
is the so-called risk free rate on safe invest-
ments. Unfortunately, the numerical differ-
ence between these two focal rates of return 
is enormous, leading to much debate and con-
fusion about what risk-adjusted discount rates 
should be used for a particular public project. 
As this paper will show, the consequences of 
how these two prototype rates are combined 
can be spectacularly important for very long 
term CBA applications—like investments in 
mitigating climate change.
The average return on all investments in 
a country is often proxied by the mean real 
historical return on a comprehensive index 
of equities traded on that country’s stock 
exchanges. For the United States, whose 
stock markets are relatively large in repre-
senting the private economy and which have 
a long uninterrupted historical record, this 
number is approximately seven percent per 
year.
2 The U.S. Office of Management and 
1 See, e.g., Stern (2008).
2 See Campbell (2003) or Mehra and Prescott (2003).
Budget uses 7 percent as an estimate of the 
average pretax real rate of return on private 
capital in the U.S. economy.3 Without fur-
ther ado, for the purposes of this paper, I 
identify the economywide average return on 
all investments as being re = 7 percent. 
The risk free rate on a safe investment is 
typically proxied by the average real return 
on very short term U.S. treasury bills. This 
number is about one percent per year.4 Once 
again proceeding without further ado, for 
the purposes of this paper, I identify the rel-
evant risk free rate on safe investments (real 
and financial) as being r f = 1 percent. 
Needless to say, it can make a stunning 
difference for long-term CBA outcomes 
whether distant-future payoffs are discounted 
at re = 7 percent or at r f = 1 percent. If a 
payoff a century and a half from now is dis-
counted at r f = 1 percent per year, its pres-
ent discounted value is over eight thousand 
times greater than if the same payoff were 
discounted at re = 7 percent per year!
To see the striking effects of different 
discount rate assumptions, consider the 
social cost of carbon (SCC). The SCC was 
estimated in 2010 by the U.S. Government 
Interagency Working Group on the Social 
Cost of Carbon, hereafter the USGI WG.5 
The USGI WG employed three integrated 
assessment models (IAMs).6 An IAM is a 
computational model with dozens of equa-
tions that combine a very basic model of 
economic growth with a very basic model of 
3 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2003).
4 See Campbell (2003) or Mehra and Prescott (2003). 
This is also very roughly the recent return on U.S. Treasury 
inflation protected thirty-year bonds.
5 See U.S. Interagency Working Group on the Social 
Cost of Carbon (2010). Also relevant is the discussion in 
Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2013). Nordhaus 
(2011) provides an interpretation, some criticisms, and 
some alternative estimates. See also Johnson and Hope 
(2012). In May 2013, using the same methodology, the 
USGI WG updated its previous estimates for the SCC. For 
consistency, I work here with the 2010 numbers.
6 The acronyms of the three IAMs are DICE, FUND, 
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climate change. The IAM is first run on the 
computer for some baseline socioeconomic 
scenario that specifies some actual path of 
CO2 emissions. This will produce a series of 
outcomes, including a baseline time series of 
future consumption levels. If the IAM has key 
uncertain elements built into it, the baseline 
consumption levels will be uncertain. Tweak 
the IAM baseline emissions policy by forcing 
it to emit one less ton of CO2 now, but oth-
erwise leave climate change policy the same 
as the base case. This will produce a series of 
altered outcomes, including an altered time 
series of uncertain future consumption levels. 
The benefit payoff in any period is the change 
in consumption between the tweaked and 
baseline scenarios for that period. Compute 
by simulations the average benefit payoff 
(equals average consumption change) in each 
period. Pick some discount rate schedule 
and calculate the present discounted value 
of average benefit payoffs. This is the SCC. 
The USGI WG averaged five socioeconomic 
scenarios over three IAMs. The preferred 
discount rate was r = 3 percent, which gener-
ated SCC=$21 per ton of CO2 in 2007 dollars, 
but sensitivity analysis was also performed for 
r =  2.5 percent and r = 5  percent.  Table 1 
shows the tremendous dependence of SCC 
on the assumed constant value of r.
Note that this SCC computation is very 
much an exercise in partial equilibrium anal-
ysis, which was required to make compari-
sons across models and scenarios. Benefits 
of expected consumption changes are calcu-
lated from one source-type (the three IAMs 
averaged over five socioeconomic scenarios). 
Then discount rates are exogenously applied 
(from another source-type, as it were) to cal-
culate present discounted values. For bet-
ter or for worse, in this paper I follow the 
same partial equilibrium approach, but I 
extend the source-type of discount rates to 
cover a particular form of risk adjustment. 
The model of this paper is extremely crude, 
its main justification being the extreme 
importance for climate-change analysis of 
the underlying set of discounting issues it is 
attempting to illustrate.
2.  An Example: Linear Decomposition of 
Payoff Risks
Let the random variable  C  t  stand for usable 
or effective net consumption at time t, after 
subtracting off the damages from climate 
change. In this setup,   C t   represents the aver-
age payoff on all investments in the econ-
omy and can be interpreted at a high level 
of abstraction as embodying the systematic 
nondiversifiable risk of the   macroeconomy 
itself. In the spirit of partial equilibrium 
analysis, the probability distribution of mac-
roeconomic output {  C  t  } is treated as given 
while small variational investment perturba-
tions around {  C  t  } are considered.
Consider a marginal investment proj-
ect proposed at the present time zero. The 
TABLE 1 
SCC as a Function of a Constant Discount Rate 
r =   7% 5% 3% 2.5% 2% 1.5% 1%
SCC = $1 $5 $21 $35 $62 $122 $266
Source: For r = 2.5%, r = 3%, and r = 5%, USGI WG. For r = 1%, r = 1.5% and r = 2%, Johnson and Hope 
(2012). For r = 7%, see Table 3.Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (September 2013) 876
project promises small payoffs of uncertain 
net benefits during future periods t, which 
are represented by the random variable   B t  . 
(In the case of climate-change investments,  
B  t   would typically represent the extra effec-
tive consumption from an extra unit of CO2 
mitigation.) The critical question we wish 
to address is the following. At what project-
specific risk-adjusted discount rate should 
expected benefits 피 B t   during time t be dis-
counted back to the present time zero?
Let the random variable   A  t   represent an 
idiosyncratic component of project benefit 
payoffs at time t that is independently dis-
tributed from   C  t  . One possible interpreta-
tion is that   A  t   represents merit goods that are 
not easily related to   C t   like, perhaps, pres-
ervation of life, which is postulated to have 
its own value more or less independent of 
income or wealth.
The key assumption I now make is that 
benefits   B  t   can be linearly decomposed into 
a component that is proportional to   A  t   plus a 
component that is proportional to   C t :
(1)   B t   =     B  t   A   +     B  t   C ,
where
(2)   B  t   A   ∝    A t 
and
(3)     B  t   C   ∝   C t  .
Formula (1) states that benefit payoffs   B t  
can be conceptualized as if coming from a 
portfolio consisting of two parts. The amount  
B  t   C   of the portfolio payoff replicates the sys-
temwide nondiversifiable risk characteristics 
of the aggregate economy, as represented by 
a comprehensive index of all investment pay-
offs   C  t  , whose return is assumed to be   r e   . In 
effect,   C t   represents macroeconomic output 
at time t. The amount   B  t   A   of the portfolio 
payoff has diversifiable risk characteristics 
that are idiosyncratically independent of the 
rest of the economy, and whose return is   r   f  .
Crudely inspired by the role of beta in 
the financial CAPM model, define the real-
project gamma at time t to be the fraction of 
expected payoff that on average is due to the 
nondiversifiable systematic risk of the uncer-
tain macroeconomy
(4)   γ  t   ≡    
 피  B  t   C 
  _ 
피  B  t 
   .
It immediately follows from (1) and (4) 
that
(5) 1  −   γ  t   =    
 피  B  t   A 
  _ 
 피  B  t 
  .
The coefficient   γ  t   is called the real-project 
gamma (at time t). It plays a role in cost–
benefit analysis very roughly analogous to a 
financial-investment beta in CAPM. As will 
be shown later, the discount rate formula for 
financial-investment betas and real-project 
gammas are of the same form for a two-
period short-run situation, but otherwise 
they may differ.
Combining (1) with (2) and (5) gives
(6)     B  t   A   =    [  (1 −   γ  t  )  
 피  B  t 
  _ 
 피  A  t 
   ]   ×   A  t  , 
while combining (1) with (3) and (4) gives
(7)    B  t   C   =   [  (  γ  t )  
 피 B t 
  _ 
 피  C  t 
   ]   ×   C  t  .
The two-factor linear decomposition of  
B  t   represented by equation (1) might appear 
to be innocuous, but it is an assumption 
nevertheless with consequences. Such a 
linear decomposition delivers simultane-
ously a clear portfolio-like conceptualiza-
tion of benefit payoffs, a clean definition 
of the real-project gamma, and a simple 877 Weitzman: Tail-Hedge Discounting and the Social Cost of Carbon
closed-form equation for a time-varying risk-
adjusted discount rate schedule expressed 
neatly in terms of  r e ,   r f  , and   γ  t  . Other (non-
linear) specifications can yield different 
results, which typically require additional 
assumptions and are not typically solvable 
in closed form. In any event, the analytically 
tractable linear specification (1) is a natural 
point of departure for conceptualizing the 
risk properties of real-project payoffs and 
deriving neat results.
Equations (1)–(7) will allow the interpre-
tation that (1  −   γ  t  ) represents the strength 
of what might be called the tail-hedge effect 
because it quantifies the fraction of benefits 
that are expected to be paid even in bad-
tail high-damage states of the world. Such 
an insurance concept seems like it might be 
especially relevant for discounting climate-
change investments like GHG mitigation.
3.  Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Schedules
Suppose the following. If   γ  t   = 1,  then 
everyone agrees that the appropriate real 
interest rate for discounting expected bene-
fits 피  B  t   is  re = 7 percent. And if   γ  t   = 0, then 
everyone agrees that the appropriate real 
interest rate for discounting expected bene-
fits  피  B  t   is rf = 1 percent. The question now 
is: what should be the risk-adjusted discount 
rate when 0  <   γ  t   <  1? From the assumed 
linear decomposition of risk factors in (1), it 
must be the value   r  t   *   satisfying
(8)  피  B  t  exp(−   r  t   *  t)  = 피  B  t   A exp(−   r f t) 
 + 피  B  t   C  exp(−   r  e t).
Use (1), (6), (7), and cancel 피  B  t   from both 
sides of the equation to rewrite (8) as
(9) exp(−   r  t   *  t) = (1 −   γ  t )exp(−   r  f t) 
 +   γ  t exp(−   r  e t).
Invert equation (9) to obtain
(10)   r  t   *   = −    1  _ 
t
  ln ((1 − γt)exp(−   r  f t) 
 + γt exp(− ret)).
Equation (10) is the fundamental result 
of the model of this paper, in which it is 
assumed that payoff risks can be linearly 
decomposed into two primary risk factors. 
There is no reason of principle why   γ  t   should 
be constant over time. We could proceed 
with a general analysis of {  r  t    *  } in terms of {  γ  t } 
using formula (10) but, for expository pur-
poses in an expository article, I think it is 
more instructive to highlight primarily the 
benchmark case of a constant real-project 
gamma.
4.  The Benchmark of a Constant  
Real-Project Gamma
Without further ado, for expository pur-
poses, I make a benchmark default assump-
tion of constant proportions of risk, meaning 
that the risk-variation characteristics of the 
payoffs   B  t   are decomposed into a constant 
proportion 1  − γ of independent idiosyn- 
cratic project-specific risk  ∝   A  t   and a 
 constant  proportion  γ of systematic nondi-
versifiable risk ∝   C t   representing the uncer-
tain macroeconomy itself. For all future 
periods t ≥ 1 , then,
(11)   γ  t   = γ.
To emphasize its dependence upon the 
assumed value of γ, henceforth   r  t   *   is  denoted  
r  t   γ  . When the simplification (11) is imposed, 
equation (10) turns into the relatively neat 
formula
(12)     r  t   γ   = −    1  _ 
t
   ln ((1 − γ)exp(−  r  f t) 
 + γ  exp(−  r  e t)).Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (September 2013) 878
Equation (12) has a sufficiently simple 
form that the properties of   r  t   γ   are easily 
  analyzed. In what follows, 0  < γ <  1  and  
r   f   <   r  e  .
Differentiating (12) and inspecting care-
fully the resulting expression indicates that 
the risk-adjusted discount rate becomes ever 
lower over time
(13)    
d r  t   γ 
  _ 
dt  
    < 0.
Using l’Hôpital’s rule to evaluate the inde-
terminate form (12) in the limit as t → 0 
gives
(14)   r  0   γ      = (1 − γ)  r  f   + γ  r  e  , 
which is a version of the famous CAPM for-
mula with γ playing the role of β. In this 
sense, financial-investment CAPM betas 
and real-project gammas coincide for a two-
period model representing short-run situa-
tions, but otherwise they may differ. 
Using l’Hôpital’s rule to evaluate the inde-
terminate form (12) in the limit as t →  ∞  
gives
(15)   r  ∞   γ       =      min   
 
    
 
   { r  f  ,  r  e  } =   r  f  .
What is the economic story behind the 
basic result that the risk-adjusted discount 
rate schedule declines over time (from 
an initial weighted average given by the 
CAPM-type formula (14) down to approach-
ing asymptotically the risk free rate)? This 
property comes from a linear specification 
that results in a gamma-weighted average 
of discount factors, rather than discount 
rates. The underlying idea is that having an 
insurance policy in the form of an invest-
ment in an asset with independent payoffs 
that hedges against really bad tail outcomes 
is relatively more valuable over time than 
having an investment in an asset replicating 
the risk characteristics of the economy as a 
whole.7
5.  Real-Project Gammas and  
Discount-Rate Schedules
In practical terms, what is perhaps the 
most difficult stumbling block for applica-
tions of the discount rate schedule (12) to 
public investments in the real world is the 
estimation of actual project-specific values 
of the real-project gamma coefficient γ. This 
is a very tricky subject worthy of further 
research.8 My own feeling is that, in many 
cases, it may be difficult to go much beyond 
general considerations. However, even if γ is 
in practice knowable only as a rough approxi-
mation to an average value, it is still useful 
to understand how its risk-adjustment role 
might be properly conceptualized. The atti-
tude of this paper is that it is better to use 
some theoretically correct risk-adjustment 
formula for γ, augmented by sensitivity 
analysis of γ, than to do nothing about risk 
adjustment. 
For unique one-off projects, like invest-
ments in mitigating climate change, it is 
going to be extremely difficult to estimate 
real-project gammas because there is no 
close real-world substitute and no historical 
record from which data could be assembled. 
For singular public investments that seem 
strongly nonprivatizable, a constructive rule 
of thumb might be to begin with the default 
position of the project-γ being set at about 
0.5, which is midway between zero and one. 
This would at least get a conversation going 
and could always be changed after more seri-
ous discussions. 
7 Some other models implying a declining discount rate 
are given in the comprehensive book of Gollier (2012).
8 Some relevant thoughts on this general subject are 
expressed in Ewijk and Tang (2003).879 Weitzman: Tail-Hedge Discounting and the Social Cost of Carbon
In any event, there is no evading the need 
to specify a value of γ for any given invest-
ment and there is no question that this can 
be more of an art than a science for one-of-
a-kind projects. With unique one-off public 
investments, like climate change, I person-
ally find it somewhat easier to use a kind of 
“revealed gamma” approach to work back-
wards from some postulated near-term dis-
count rate   r  0   γ   (which people have used in 
practice and for which I have some feel) to 
the underlying revealed gamma value of γ. 
Inverting the near-term CAPM-formula-like 
equation (14) in this way gives a revealed 
gamma value of
(16)  γ =    
  r  0   γ   −   r  f 
  _ 
  r  e   −   r  f 
   , 
where   r  e   =  7 percent and   r  f   = 1  percent. 
Table 2 displays risk-adjusted discount rate 
schedules for seven representative near-
term values:   r  0   γ   = 1 percent,   r  0   γ   =  2  percent,  
r  0   γ   = 3 percent,   r  0   γ   = 4 percent,   r  0   γ   = 5 per-
cent,   r  0   γ   = 6 percent, and   r  0   γ   = 7 percent.
Note that, for mid-range values of 
1/3 ≤ γ ≤ 2/3, which corresponds to near-
term discount rates 3 percent ≤   r  0   γ   ≤ 5 per-
cent, the benchmark century discount rates 
are all fairly low, much closer to   r  f   = 1 
percent than to   r  e   =  7 percent. Even for 
a real-project gamma as high as γ = 5/6, 
which corresponds to a near-term discount 
rate   r  0   γ   =  6 percent, the century discount 
rate of 2.8 percent is appreciably closer to   
r  f   = 1 percent than to   r  e   = 7 percent. All 
of this is a consequence of the enormous 
discrepancy between   r  f    =  1 percent and   
r  e   = 7 percent, which makes the term struc-
ture of risk-adjusted discount rates decline 
steeply over time in approaching the asymp-
totic limit of   r  f   = 1 percent.
While there is no getting around the fact that 
the time schedule of risk-adjusted   discount 
rates depends upon the assumed value of 
the real-project gamma, the results of table 2 
suggest a strong downward pull over time. 
This is a basic message of the paper. The large 
equity premium of   r  e   −   r  f   = 6 percent oper-
ating over long time periods tends to cause 
the time profile of risk-adjusted discount 
rates to tilt steeply downwards. The stan-
dard practice is to use the constant gamma-
averaged short-term CAPM-formula-like 
discount  rates   r  0   γ   = (1 − γ)  r  f   + γ  r  e   (given 
by the column t =  0 in table  2 instead 
of the gamma-averaged discount factors 
exp(−   r  t   γ  t) = (1 − γ)exp (−   r  f t) + γ  exp(−   r  e  t) 
(which give rise to the declining risk-
adjusted discount rate schedules displayed 
TABLE 2 
Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates   r  t  
γ   (% per year, rounded off)
t (yrs): t = 0 t = 25 t = 50 t = 100 t = 150 t = 200 t = 300
γ = 0 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
γ = 1/6 2% 1.6% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
γ = 1/3 3% 2.2% 1.8% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1%
γ = 1/2 4% 3.0% 2.3% 1.7% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2%
γ = 2/3 5% 3.9% 3.0% 2.1% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4%
γ = 5/6 6% 5.2% 4.1% 2.8% 2.2% 1.9% 1.6%
γ = 1 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (September 2013) 880
in table 2). The message conveyed by table 2 
is that this standard practice (of conceptual-
izing risk adjustments by modifying the dis-
count rate while otherwise allowing it to be 
constant) could possibly have the potential 
for significantly biasing CBA against long-
term tail-hedge investments whose real-
project gamma is less than one.
6.  What is the Real-Project Gamma for 
Climate Change?
What is the appropriate real-project 
gamma for an investment that reduces by 
one ton the present emissions of CO2? This 
is a key question, the answer to which I don’t 
think anyone knows. About the best we can 
do here to gain intuition, I fear, may be to tell 
partial-equilibrium stories.
One insurance-like story would argue for 
a lower gamma on the grounds that climate 
change itself is part of effective consumption, 
especially for the very bad climate outcomes 
that might accompany business-as-usual high 
CO2 scenarios. Unknown uncertainties in cli-
mate-change feedbacks, for example, could 
lead to unforeseen catastrophic outcomes 
with very low values of effective consump-
tion   C  t  . In such a bad-tail scenario, there is a 
buffer or hedge built into the CO2 mitigation 
investment that is expected to pay benefits   
B  t   A   independent of how catastrophically low 
is   C  t  . The strength of this insurance-buffer-
ing effect is measured by 1 − γ = 피  B  t   A  /피  B  t  . 
Like the CAPM story about low-beta invest-
ments but with a time-dependent twist, this 
story views CO2 mitigation as a low-gamma 
hedge asset that helps to insure against low-
growth climate disasters.9
In the more standard story about a 
real-project gamma, economic growth is 
exogenous and higher growth of conven-
tional future consumption is more strongly 
9 This is effectively the approach taken in Sandsmark 
and Vennemo (2007).
 associated with larger absolute damages from 
climate change. This occurs directly and 
mechanically because damages are assumed 
to be strictly proportional to stochastic 
realizations of effective consumption.10 It 
also occurs indirectly because higher growth 
is assumed to be associated with higher 
emissions and higher buildup of CO2. In this 
standard story, good states of higher future 
consumption will be associated with higher 
absolute future benefits from current cur-
tailment of CO2, thereby implying a higher 
gamma.11 Thus, if standard IAMs are used to 
calculate a project gamma then, with only a 
little or no weighting of catastrophic climate 
outcomes, they will typically come up with a 
relatively high value of γ.
To summarize, without relatively heavy 
weights on catastrophic climate damages, 
the middle-of-the-distribution IAMs will 
tend implicitly to choose higher values of 
a real-project gamma for CO2 mitigation 
investments. But a model with sufficiently 
heavy weight on outlier catastrophic cli-
mate damages will tend to favor lower values 
of a real-project gamma for CO2 mitiga-
tion investments, by viewing such invest-
ments more as hedge insurance against 
potentially disastrous outcomes. The key 
issue is whether to emphasize uncertain 
climate-change damages in the middle-of-
the-distribution range where they are likely 
dwarfed by growth uncertainty, or in the 
low-probability worst-case tail-risk scenarios 
of catastrophic climate outcomes sufficiently 
extreme to dominate the uncertainty about 
economic growth.12
10 This multiplicative damages assumption is far from 
being innocuous and accounts for much of the policy-
ramp gradualism that emerges from many IAMs because 
it allows higher output to substitute readily for higher tem-
peratures. See Weitzman (2010) for more details.
11 See, e.g., Nordhaus (2011).
12 This issue is further elaborated in the clear exposition 
of Litterman (2013).881 Weitzman: Tail-Hedge Discounting and the Social Cost of Carbon
7.  The Social Cost of Carbon, Again
As an exercise, I had the SCC recalculated 
with the exact same methodology used by 
USGI WG but, instead of a constant discount 
rate, I employed the risk-adjusted time-
varying discount rate schedule from for-
mula (12) that produces the numbers shown 
in table 2.13 The outcomes are displayed in 
table  3 and generally result in quite high 
values for the SCC. For example, the near-
term discount rate of   r  0   γ   ≈ 3 percent, which 
was used in practice as a central estimate by 
the USGI WG (and which corresponds to a 
revealed gamma value of γ = 1/3) yields for 
this case SCC = $183 per ton of CO2, which 
is quite a significant increase from the USGI 
WG central estimate of SCC  = $21.  Even 
a near-term discount rate of   r  0   γ   ≈ = 6 per-
cent, which corresponds to a relatively high 
revealed gamma value of γ = 5/6, yields for 
this case SCC = $45 per ton of CO2 or about 
double the central estimate of SCC = $21.
The determination of the appropriate real 
project gamma for calculating the SCC is a 
very difficult issue. As yet there is no easy 
answer to the question of what is the appro-
priate value of gamma. At the end of the day, 
I think the most we can hope for is to be 
aware of the basic issues and to try out vari-
ous values of γ in practice.
13 I am indebted to Laurie Johnson for doing these cal-
culations for PAGE, David Anthoff for FUND, and Antony 
Millner for DICE. Without their help, I could not have 
produced table 3.
8.  Concluding Comments
This paper touches upon several themes.
The paper reinforces the idea that adjust-
ing the discount rate to incorporate project 
risk represents a significant unsettled issue 
for CBA of long-term public investments. 
An economic analysis of climate-change 
investment policies, for example, depends 
enormously on what discount rate is cho-
sen. This in turn requires resolution of the 
issues raised about how best to incorporate 
project uncertainty into a risk-adjusted dis-
count rate. The resultant indeterminacy is 
undesirable, but seems unavoidable at this 
stage.
The default conceptualization of risk-
adjusted discounting has mostly envisioned 
using a constant discount rate given by the 
short-term CAPM-like equation of the form   
r  0   γ   = (1 − γ)  r  f   + γ  r  e  . (In principle, it might 
be acknowledged that γ should be allowed to 
depend on time but, in practice, the discus-
sion rarely gets this far because it is difficult 
enough to determine an average γ for long-
term public projects, much less to specify its 
time dependence.) The model of this paper 
is an extremely primitive partial-equilibrium 
exposition with a lot of simplistic assump-
tions built into it, many of which might legiti-
mately be challenged. The assumption of a 
linear decomposition of risk variation sug-
gests that what might be better combined in a 
gamma-weighted average at time t is not the 
two focal discount rates   r  e   and    r  f  , but rather 
their two corresponding discount factors 
TABLE 3 
SCC (2007 Dollars per Ton of CO2) as Function of   r  0  
γ
     or γ
  r  0   γ    =   1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
γ =   0 1/6 1/3 1/2 2/3 5/6 1
SCC = $266 $228 $183 $140 $92 $45 $1Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (September 2013) 882
exp(−   r  e t) and exp(−   r  f t), via an equation 
of the form exp(−   r  t   γ  t)  = (1 − γ)exp(−   r  f t) 
+ γ  exp(−   r  e t). This implies a time-depen-
dent discount rate   r  t   γ   that declines over time 
from the initial value   r  0   γ    = (1 − γ)  r  f   + γ  
r  e   down to the asymptotic value   r  ∞   γ    =   r  f  . 
Even if the real-project gamma is not known 
exactly, it is still useful to understand how 
its risk-adjustment role might be concep-
tualized when a climate-change investment 
includes a component that hedges against 
the bad tail of catastrophic damages by insur-
ing positive expected benefits even under 
the worst circumstances.
Because there is such a significant equity-
premium difference between discount rates 
of   r 
e   =  7 percent and   r  f   = 1  percent  per 
year, there can be an enormous discrep-
ancy between the corresponding discount 
factors for time spans of a century or more. 
Other things being equal, this implies a 
relatively rapid decline of   r  t   γ   and leads to 
the main empirical implication of the paper. 
The standard practice of incorporating risk 
adjustments by modifying a constant dis-
count rate may have the potential for sig-
nificantly biasing CBA against long-term 
investments whose real-project gamma is 
less than one.
Finally, this paper is suggesting the 
importance of a research agenda that might 
put more effort into determining—if only 
very roughly and on average—the real proj-
ect-specific gammas for long-term public 
investments. Climate change in general, 
and the SCC in particular, leap to mind 
as obvious applications wanting further 
attention.
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